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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 990734-CA 
vs. 
DARREN JAMES TUCKETT, 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for homicide by assault, a third degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-209 (1999), in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, the Honorable Donald J. Eyre presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL and STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly instruct the jury that a trespasser has no right of 
self-defense against a homeowner seeking to remove him using lawful force? 
"The standard of review for jury instructions to which counsel has objected is 
correctness." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah App. 1998) (citation 
omitted). 
2. Was the prosecutor's responsive statement in closing that an argument 
could be made that the facts supported a higher charge and therefore that the 
prosecution had given defendant "the benefit of that doubt" in charging as they did 
plain error? 
Defendant asserts plain error. See Br. Aplt. at 1-2. To establish plain error, 
an appellant must demonstrate three elements: (i) An error occurred; (ii) the error 
was obvious; and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 
(Utah 1993). If any one of these elements is missing, there is no plain error. Id. at 
1209. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following provisions: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-209 (Supp. 1998). Homicide by assault - Penalty. 
(1) A person commits homicide by assault if, under circumstances not 
amounting to aggravated murder, murder, or manslaughter, a person causes 
the death of another while intentionally or knowingly attempting, with 
unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another. 
(2) Homicide by assault is a third degree felony. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402(l)-(3) (1995). Force in defense of person. 
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another 
when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is 
necessary to defend himself or a third person against such otherfs imminent 
use of unlawful force. However, that person is justified in using force 
intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only if he or she 
reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily 
injury to himself or a third person as a result of the other's imminent use of 
unlawful force, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. 
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(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances 
specified in Subsection (1) if he or she: 
(a) initially provokes the use of force against himself with the intent to 
use force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; 
(b) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the 
commission or attempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) (i) was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement, 
unless he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to 
the other person his intent to do so and, notwithstanding, the other person 
continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful force; and 
(ii) for purposes of Subsection (i) the following do not, by 
themselves, constitute "combat by agreement": 
(A) voluntarily entering into or remaining in an ongoing 
relationship; or 
(B) entering or remaining in a place where one has a legal right 
to be. 
(3) A person does not have a duty to retreat from the force or threatened 
force described in Subsection (1) in a place where that person has lawfully 
entered or remained, except as provided in Subsection (2)(c). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-405(1) (1995). Force in defense of habitation. 
(1) A person is justified in using force against another when and to the 
extent that he reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or 
terminate the other's unlawful entry into or attack upon his habitation; 
however, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to 
cause death or serious bodily injury only if: 
(a) the entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous manner, 
surreptitiously, or by stealth, and he reasonably believes that the entry is 
attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or offering personal 
violence to any person, dwelling, or being in the habitation and he 
reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent the assault or 
offer of personal violence; or 
(b) he reasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for the 
purpose of committing a felony in the habitation and that the force is 
necessary to prevent the commission of the felony. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-206(2) (Supp. 1998). Criminal trespass. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not 
amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 
76-6-204: 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to 
any property, including the use of graffiti as defined in Section 
76-6-107; 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the 
safety of another; or 
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on 
property as to which notice against entering is given by: 
(i) personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone 
with apparent authority to act for the owner; 
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude 
intruders; 
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of 
intruders. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with homicide by assault, a third 
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-209 (Supp. 1998) (R. 1). 
After a three-day trial, a jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 123-27, 174). 
Defendant was sentenced to the statutory term and restitution (R. 192-93). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 195, 203). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On a Sunday afternoon in November 1998, defendant pushed Kirk Openshaw, 
one of his best friends, down a flight of stairs (R. 220: 97-98; 221:39, 89). He used 
enough force that his 260-pound friend cleared the entire flight of stairs, landing 
directly on the concrete floor below (R. 220: 98, 100, 161, 221:16, 61-62, 125). 
The impact to Kirk's head killed him (R. 221:14-15). 
Kirk was living with his mother, Ardella Openshaw, in her Payson home (R. 
220: 86-87). Kirk's sister Cara Openshaw and friend Greg Alvey also lived there 
(R. 220: 86-87, 221: 89). About 9:00 that morning, defendant and Jason Jenkins 
stopped by (R. 221: 40, 89). They were drunk or high or both (R. 221: 95). They 
invited Kirk and Greg to drive to Provo with them to pick up their paychecks and 
party (R. 221: 40, 95). Kirk, hung over and sleepy, declined (R. 221: 40). After 
visiting with Greg, defendant and Jason left for Provo (R. 221: 40, 89). 
Defendant, Jason, Greg, and Kirk had all been drinking that day (R. 221: 113). 
Defendant had consumed seven or eight beers and some cocaine and had taken 
methamphetamine at about 4:00 that morning (R. 221: 47, 56). Kirk's autopsy 
revealed a blood alcohol content of .13 and minuscule levels of amphetamine and 
cocaine (R. 221: 16-19) (the "lowest level of detectability"). 
1
 Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1205-06 (Utah 1993). 
5 
When Jason picked up his paycheck in Provo, he noticed it was a couple of 
hundred dollars short; his boss told him that Greg had picked up the money (R. 221: 
40). Defendant said that "if somebody done that to me . . . I would probably go 
over there and punch him in the face" (R. 221: 59). 
Between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m., defendant and Jason showed up again at 
Ardella's home (R. 220:88; 221: 41, 89). Once there, Jason—drunk and with a beer 
in his hand—rushed at Greg, who was standing at the back kitchen door smoking, 
and slugged him (R. 221: 90). A confrontation ensued (R. 221: 41). Defendant got 
out of the van and told Jason and Greg, "you guys have got to knock it off. Ardelia 
is freaking out and they're going to call the cops and we're all going to get arrested" 
(R. 221: 42). Defendant later said he did not "want anything to come up to violate 
[his] probation" (R. 221:49). 
Defendant sent Jason to the van and explained to Greg why Jason was upset 
(R. 221: 42, 91). Then, while defendant went to fetch Jason out of the van, Greg 
went into the house, woke up Kirk, and asked him to get rid of Jason (R. 221: 42-
43, 92-93). Greg was afraid that violence would erupt since everyone had been 
drinking—defendant "had been drinking a lot" (R. 221: 113). Greg was scared of 
defendant because defendant was bigger than Greg and they "had gotten in fights 
before," once with the result that Greg went to the hospital (R. 221: 102-03). 
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Ardella and Cara were sitting in the kitchen when defendant began pounding 
on the kitchen door and yelling (R. 220: 89). Cara unlocked the door and let him in 
(R. 220: 89, 121). Defendant entered, stood on the landing inside the door at the 
top of the stairs, and asked for Greg (R. 220: 90, 92). Ardella asked defendant to 
leave "[a]bout twice" because she "could tell that he had been drinking or doping or 
something" (R. 220: 92, 94). Defendant refused to leave (R. 220:92). He was 
"hyper" and remained on the landing "standing and dancing" (R. 220: 92). 
Kirk then came into the kitchen from the bedroom where Greg had awakened 
him (R. 220: 94, 123). Kirk told defendant to "get the flick out of here" because 
"mom don't need this" (R. 220: 94, 123-24; 221: 93). Defendant would not leave 
and "just kept dancing" (R. 220: 95, 123). Kirk then went to the landing and tried 
to "shoo" defendant out with his hand (R. 220: 97, 125). Kirk was standing with 
one foot on the landing and the other on the top stair (R. 220: 96, 124). Defendant 
knew that the floor at the foot of the stairs was concrete (R. 221: 65). 
As Kirk continued his efforts to remove him, defendant stepped back, braced 
himself, and pushed Kirk backward, saying "There you go" (R. 220: 97, 125-126). 
Kirk's arms flew up and "down he went"; he "didn't even hit a stair" on the way 
down (R. 220: 97-98, 221: 65). But at the concrete floor, the 260-pound Kirk "hit 
hard" (R. 221: 16, 64-65). Defendant peered down the stairs and thought, "oh my 
God he's dead" (R. 220: 126; 221: 64). When Jason came to the door asking after 
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Kirk, defendant replied merely that "he was downstairs," but added, "let's get out of 
here" (R. 220: 98-99). 
Ardella hurried to the stairs without her walker, saw Kirk, and screamed; Cara 
called 911 (R. 220: 99-101, 127). Cara then asked Greg, still in the back room, to 
try to revive Kirk, but Ardella "knew he was dead as soon as he hit. . . That's 
something mothers know" (R. 220: 99, 127). 
The medical examiner later found a two-and-a-half inch long laceration on the 
back of Kirk's head (R. 221: 11-12). The impact "transmitted force through the 
skull, through the brain," and fractured the petrous bone, the hardest bone in the 
human body (R. 221: 14). Kirk died as a result of blunt force injuries to his head 
(R. 221: 15). 
In defendant's version of events, Kirk was the aggressor and said, "if you 
don't get the hell out of the house I'll kill you," then ran across the kitchen and 
started attacking defendant (R. 221: 44). According to defendant, Kirk pinned him 
in the corner and was choking him and would not let go (id). Gasping for air and 
fearing for his safety, defendant pushed Kirk, who "went over the edge of the 
stairs," as defendant put it (R. 221: 45). Defendant fled, he testified, for fear that 
Kirk "was going to come up there and finish what he started, beating the hell out of 
me" as well as out of "fear of the cops" (R. 221: 46). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Jury instructions, a. Instruction no. 11 correctly instructed the jury that a 
trespasser may use force to defend himself only against deadly force. The self-
defense doctrine justifies the use of force against another's "imminent use of 
unlawful force." Non-deadly force used to remove a trespasser is not unlawful. 
Therefore, a trespasser has no right to respond with force. However, a homeowner 
may use deadly force to remove a trespasser only under specified circumstances 
arguably absent here. Therefore, had Kirk Openshaw used deadly force against 
defendant, it might have been unlawful, thereby justifying defendant's use offeree. 
b. Instruction no. 8 correctly instructed the jury on the elements of criminal 
trespass. The jury was required to determine whether defendant was a trespasser in 
order to correctly apply the self-defense doctrine. 
2. Closing argument. In closing, the prosecutor stated that, although the 
State had charged homicide by assault, the facts might have supported a murder 
charge; hence, the State had "given the defendant the benefit of that doubt already." 
No plain error occurred. First, the prosecutor was merely responding to defense 
counsel's reference in opening to the State's charging decision. Second, properly 
understood in context of the trial, the prosecutor's comments had no potential to 
mislead the jury as to its responsibility to fully consider reasonable doubt. Finally, 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY ON SELF-DEFENSE BECAUSE A 
TRESPASSER HAS A DUTY TO RETREAT FROM 
REASONABLE FORCE OR THREATENED FORCE IN A 
PLACE WHERE HE HAS UNLAWFULLY ENTERED 
OR REMAINED 
Defendant claims that jury instruction no. 11, addressing a trespasser's right to 
defend himself, was erroneous. See Br. Aplt. at 15-17. Defendant further claims that 
the court erred in giving instruction no. 8, defining "criminal trespass." Id. at 17-18. 
A. Jury instruction no. 11 was correct: a trespasser has no right to 
resist a homeowner's reasonable use of non-deadly force to 
remove him. 
Defendant contends that jury instruction no. 11 unduly restricted his right to self-
defense. That instruction reads: "You are instructed that if a person is trespassing on 
someone else's property, he is still entitled to use force to defend himself if he 
reasonably believes force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury" (R. 
161). Defendant argues that this instruction illegally restricts a trespasser's right to self-
defense to situations where he reasonably believes force is necessary to prevent death or 
serious bodily injury. Br. Aplt. at 16. 
Defendant claims that use of force in self-defense by a trespasser is no less 
justified than use of force in self-defense by one lawfully present. Id. Thus, citing 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402(1) (Supp. 1998), he asserts that "[nowhere] in the 
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language of § 76-2-402 does it indicate that if a person is trespassing then that 
individual cannot use force to defend himself unless 'he reasonably believes force is 
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury.'" Br. Aplt. at 15. 
This argument rests on an incomplete reading of the applicable statutes. On its 
face, the portion of section 76-2-402(1) that defendant quotes does not in fact restrict 
trespassers from using force in defense of person. See Br. Aplt. at 15. However, 
defendant's truncated quotation of section 76-2-402(1) omits the language crucial to 
resolution of his claim. The quoted sentence reads in its entirety: 
A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when 
and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary 
to defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of 
unlawful force. 
Id. (emphasis added). By its plain terms, section 76-2-402(1) justifies the use of force 
in defense of person only against another's imminent use of unlawful force. 
Consequently, the question turns on whether the force used by Kirk Openshaw—against 
which defendant was purportedly defending himself—was lawful. 
Openshaw's use of force was lawful because a homeowner may use reasonable, 
non-lethal force to remove a trespasser: 
A person is justified in using force against another when and to the extent 
that he reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or 
terminate the other's unlawful entry into or attack upon his habitation; 
however, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to 
cause death or serious bodily injury only if: 
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(a) the entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous manner, 
surreptitiously, or by stealth . . .; or 
(b) he reasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for the 
purpose of committing a felony . . . 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-405(1) (Supp. 1998). This statute includes "not only a 
person's actual residence, but also whatever place he may be occupying peacefully as a 
substitute home or habitation, such as a hotel, motel, or even where he is a guest in the 
home of another." State v. Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1977) (citations 
omitted). 
The trespasser has no concomitant right to respond with force, since only one 
lawfully on the premises may stand his ground when faced with force or threatened 
force: "A person does not have a duty to retreat from the force or threatened force 
described in Subsection (1) in a place where that person has lawfully entered or 
remained;' § 76-2-402(3). 
Read together, these sections make clear that a trespasser has no right of self-
defense against a homeowner using reasonable force to remove him; he must retreat. 
This approach rationally resolves an impasse such as the one presented by this case: the 
homeowner may use reasonable force; the intruder must retreat. It thus tends to 
"preserv[e] the peace and good order of society." Mitcheson, 560 P.2d at 1122. In 
contrast, the rule defendant advocates is irrational. To authorize a landowner to use 
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reasonable force to remove a trespasser and at the same time to authorize the trespasser 
to resist with force would promote combat. 
Thus, defendant was justified in using force in response to Openshaw's use of 
non-deadly force only if defendant was not trespassing. The prosecutor made this very 
point in closing (see R. 222: 44-45). 
Jury instruction no. 11 also provides that a trespasser "is still entitled to use force 
to defend himself if he reasonably believes force is necessary to prevent death or serious 
bodily injury" (R. 161). This, too, correctly states the law. Under section 76-2-405(1), 
a homeowner may use "force which is intended or likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury only" under specified circumstances, such as where the entry is "made or 
attempted in a violent and tumultuous manner, surreptitiously, or by stealth . . ." 
Thus, assuming defendant's entry into the Openshaw house was not violent, 
tumultuous, surreptitious, etc., any use of deadly force against him would have been 
unlawful. Defendant would therefore have been justified in responding to deadly force 
with deadly force under the general self-defense rule. See § 76-2-402(1) (a person is 
justified in using force against another as reasonably necessary to defend himself against 
another's imminent use of "unlawful force."). 
Instruction no. 11 was thus correct in all respects. 
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B. Jury instruction no. 8 on criminal trespass was properly given: 
the jury was required to determine whether defendant was 
lawfully on the premises in order to determine the scope of his 
right to self-defense. 
Defendant claims that jury instruction no. 8, defining criminal trespass, was also 
in error. Br. Aplt. at 17. Jury instruction no. 8 sets forth the elements of criminal 
trespass, generally tracking the statutory language, but omitting irrelevancies. Compare 
R. 164 with UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-206(2) (1999). 
Defendant does not claim that jury instruction no. 8 inaccurately states the law of 
criminal trespass, but contends that it "needlessly confused the jury by suggesting to the 
jury that Openshaw may have been justified in using force against Tuckett because 
Tuckett was conceivably trespassing and Openshaw had not [sic] duty to retreat because 
of his lawful presence." Id. This is so, he reasons, because the "statutory elements [of 
criminal trespass] were not relevant. . . to any justification of self-defense." Id. 
However, far from being irrelevant, the elements of criminal trespass were 
essential to a determination of defendant's claim of self-defense. As demonstrated 
above, if defendant was trespassing, Openshaw had no duty to retreat and was justified 
in using non-deadly force to remove him. Consequently, the jury was required to 
determine whether defendant was trespassing in order to resolve defendant's self-
defense claim. Accordingly, omitting an instruction on the elements of criminal trespass 
may well have been error; including one certainly was not. 
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POINT II 
THE PROSECUTOR'S RESPONSIVE STATEMENT IN CLOSING 
THAT AN ARGUMENT COULD BE MADE THAT THE FACTS 
SUPPORTED A HIGHER CHARGE AND THEREFORE THAT THE 
PROSECUTION HAD GIVEN DEFENDANT "THE BENEFIT OF 
THAT DOUBT" IN CHARGING AS THEY DID WAS NOT PLAIN 
ERROR 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor made comments amounting to prosecutorial 
misconduct in closing and that the trial court committed plain error by not intervening. 
See Br. Aplt. at 19. 
In his opening statement, defense counsel stated: 
And there's no way that [defendant] would push or do anything that would 
result in Kirk's death intentionally. And because of that the State has not 
charged [defendant] with that. And that is something very important for you 
to understand from the outset, is the State has charged [defendant] with 
Homicide By Assault, meaning they aren't asserting that he intended to 
cause Kirk's death. 
(R. 220: 72). In closing, the prosecutor responded as follows: 
Conversely, just to remind you, it is definitely not necessary that we 
show you that he intended to kill Kirk Openshaw. Frankly, if we felt 
strongly enough that these facts showed that, the defendant would stand here 
charged with murder, a first degree felony, and not homicide by assault, a 
third degree felony. We are not claiming from the facts of this trial that he 
intended to cause Kirk Openshaw's death, and we don't have to. 
Frankly, there are arguments that can be made to that effect. I will be 
talking about some of the facts of this case that show that that push was 
completely unjustified and that any reasonable person would have 
recognized that it could have caused serious bodily injury or death, and 
there was potential for that charge to be brought. We have given the 
defendant the benefit of that doubt already, and we have charged him with 
homicide by assault and not murder. 
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(R. 222: 35). Defense counsel did not object at the time, although twelve transcript 
pages later he held an unreported sidebar discussion (R. 222: 47) and much later made a 
record on this point (R. 222: 99). 
In closing, defense counsel underscored his original point: 
And even the State knew that they couldn't prove that [defendant] had 
a specific intent to push him down the stairs, as the State mentioned, or they 
would have charged him with a greater offense[,] which they did not do. It 
doesn't change the fact they still have the burden to prove all the elements 
in this case beyond a reasonable doubt to you here today[,] which they have 
conceded they could not do by charging the case the way they did. 
(R. 222: 72). The prosecutor did not mention the issue in rebuttal. 
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor's comments were "improper because what 
crime the State could have charged [defendant] with is not a matter that the jury would 
be justified in considering in reaching a verdict on the offense for which he was 
charged." Br. Aplt. at 19. He argues further that the prosecutor's statement that the 
State had already given defendant the benefit of the doubt implied that "the jury did not 
need to consider the evidence themselves to determine the existence of reasonable 
doubt" about defendant's guilt. Id. 
Defendant asserts plain error. Id. In this context, a claim of plain error in effect 
faults the trial court for not intervening and "sua sponte objecting to the prosecutor's 
comments." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 550 (Utah App. 1998). 
General principles. To prevail on a claim based on prosecutorial misconduct, 
defendant must show that the prosecutor's remarks "called to the jurors' attention 
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matters which they would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict" and, if 
so, that the remarks were harmful. State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 1982). 
"Our law permits trial counsel wide latitude in presenting closing arguments to the 
jury." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 561 n.45 (Utah 1987). "In assessing whether 
there was prejudicial error in the prosecutor's comments, [the court] will consider the 
comments both in context of the arguments advanced by both sides as well as in context 
of all the evidence." State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, at 1f 56, 979 P.2d 799. 
Defendant must also show, under the plain error doctrine, that the error was both 
obvious and prejudicial. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). An error is 
not obvious if the prosecutor's comments are ambiguous and no settled case law directly 
addresses the type of comment at issue. State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 805 (Utah App. 
1998) (citing State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("Utah courts have 
repeatedly held that a trial court's error is not plain where there is no settled appellate 
law to guide the trial court.")), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998).. 
Error. There was no reversible error in the prosecutor's reference to a greater 
charge. Defendant argues that "what crime the State could have charged [defendant] 
with is not a matter that the jury would be justified in considering in reaching a verdict 
on the offense for which he was charged." Br. Aplt. at 19. However, where defense 
counsel chooses to initiate and argue a fact or issue and then fails to object to the 
prosecutor's response, any error in the prosecutor's response will be deemed invited and 
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therefore waived. Tillman, 750 P.2d at 561; State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153, 157 (Utah 
App. 1997). 
That is the case here. Defense counsel himself initiated the issue of other crimes 
by noting in his opening that the State had not charged defendant with an intentional 
killing (R. 220: 72). In his closing, the prosecutor responded to this argument. He 
acknowledged that the State had not charged defendant with the greater offense of 
murder and was not claiming defendant intended to cause Openshaw's death (R. 222: 
35). However, he attempted to neutralize any defense-favorable inferences by adding 
that because "any reasonable person would have recognized that [the push] could have 
caused serious bodily injury or death," the facts might actually have supported a greater 
charge (R. 222: 35).2 
Defense counsel did not timely object to the prosecutor's comments. But he had 
the last word on this topic in closing, reiterating that "even the State knew that they 
couldn't prove that [defendant] had a specific intent to push him down the stairs, as the 
2
 According to the district judge, who also sat as the magistrate in the preliminary hearing: 
It was apparent at the preliminary hearing that a manslaughter charge, a second 
degree felony, is supported by probable cause, but that it could be difficult to 
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was "aware of but 
consciously disregarded" the "substantial... risk" that death could result from 
such as fall, as required by statute. 
(R. 109). 
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State mentioned, or they would have charged him with a greater offense which they did 
not do" (R. 222: 72). 
Thus, even if in isolation the prosecutor's reference to a possible greater charge 
might be considered improper, in context it was permissible. To hold otherwise would 
be to tie the hands of one side only. 
Similarly, the prosecutor's offhand reference to having given defendant "the 
benefit of that doubt" in charging him with homicide by assault rather than some greater 
crime was not improper. Defendant's suggestion that this comment undermined the 
reasonable doubt standard is unpersuasive for two reasons. 
First, the comment cannot reasonably be understood as referring to doubt about 
defendant's guilt of the charged crime. The prosecutor stated that the State had given 
defendant the benefit of "that doubt." "That doubt" referred in context only to doubt as 
to whether defendant had committed homicide by assault or some greater crime. It did 
not refer to doubt as to whether defendant was guilty of homicide by assault. The 
comment did imply that the prosecutor harbored no doubt about defendant's guilt of the 
charged offense; but that fact must have been obvious to the jury, and properly so. 
Second, context refutes defendant's claim. The jury was thoroughly instructed on 
reasonable doubt. "Reasonable doubt" was defined in jury instruction no. 4 and 
mentioned in six other instructions (nos. 2, 3, 12, 14, 15, 23) (R. 145-71). Defense 
counsel emphasized reasonable doubt in his closing. He quoted instruction no. 4 in part 
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("Reasonable doubt is a doubt for which a reason can be given based on the evidence"), 
then applied this definition to the evidence for 22 transcript pages (R. 222: 70-92). He 
concluded: "And once you have reasonable doubt as to any of the elements of the 
charged offense or reasonable doubt even as to whether or not my client, Mr. Tuckett, 
was acting in self-defense, that is all that the defense needs to show in order to require 
you as jurors to find my client not guilty" (R. 222: 91). "We have more than shown 
reasonable doubt in this case," he emphasized (R. 222: 91-92). 
Finally, instruction no. 14 clearly told the jury if they harbored a reasonable doubt 
"you should acquit the defendant" (R. 157-58). No reasonable juror could have 
considered this obligation to have been abrogated by the prosecutor's charging decision. 
Obviousness. Even assuming arguendo that the prosecutor's statement called the 
jury's attention to matters they could not properly consider, it would not have been 
obvious to the court that intervention was required. The remarks are ambiguous and 
defendant has cited "no settled case law in this state directly addressing comments" of 
this type, Baker, 963 P.2d at 805, nor is the State aware of any. Any error was 
therefore not obvious. 
Moreover, this Court has expressed its hesitancy "to set a rule which would 
require a trial judge to intervene in closing argument whenever the judge believes a 
misstatement of the evidence by counsel has occurred. Whether or not objections to 
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such misstatements are to be made is trial counsel's decision." State v. Palmer, 860 
P.2d 339, 344 (Utah App. 1993). 
The Court's hesitancy has sound policy underpinnings. Whether to interrupt the 
flow of an opponent's closing argument is a tactical decision, requiring counsel to weigh 
the benefit of a curative instruction or possible mistrial motion against the risk of 
drawing the jury's attention to a misstatement which can usually be corrected by 
counter-argument. Requiring trial judges to police closing arguments would wrest this 
tactical decision from counsel, where our adversary system traditionally places it. See 
id. However, with control comes responsibility; therefore, "[i]n the vast majority of 
instances, failure to object to such a misstatement will be deemed a waiver of the error." 
Id. 
Thus, Utah courts rarely find that a trial court committed plain error by not 
intervening in a prosecutor's closing argument where the defense does not object. See, 
e.g., State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993); State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475 (Utah 
1989); Tillman, 750 P.2d at 556-57; State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1112-13 (Utah 
1985); State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 904 (Utah App. 1994) (no error), reversed on 
other grounds, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996); State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 853 (Utah 
App. 1992) (no error); State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207 (Utah App. 1991) (all finding no 
plain or reversible error where defendant did not object to prosecutor's closing 
argument). The lone exception appears to be State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 344-45 
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(Utah App. 1993) (reversing based on prosecutor's reference to incident of sexual abuse, 
to hot tub business, and to "seven charges," all unsupported by evidence at trial). 
Prejudice. Absent reference to unproven facts or personal knowledge, improper 
closing argument is rarely prejudicial. See, e.g., Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1224 (holding 
reference to jury's obligation to society was not prejudicial under plain error analysis); 
State v. Thomas, 111 P.2d 445, 447-48 (Utah 1989) (holding objected-to reference to 
defendant's race was harmless error); Tillman, 750 P.2d at 553-57 (finding no reversible 
error where prosecutor contrasted Tillman with his accomplice who "did tell the truth 
and she didn't demand immunity, she didn't demand an attorney or all the other things 
indicative of guilt," and argued that a sentence less than death would send the signal 
that "[t]he law has no meaning and we can randomly go about intentionally, knowingly 
killing people"); State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1112-13 (Utah 1985) (holding 
prosecutor's argument that "our way of life" was on trial and that the jury should 
consider the public's perception of its verdict was harmless error); State v. Stevenson, 
884 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that prosecutor's comparing defendant 
to notorious murderer Ted Bundy was harmless error); but see State v. Andreason, 718 
P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986) (reversing where defendant timely objected at trial to 
prosecutor's argument that "People are watching to see how we administer justice" and 
that defendants were "not the only ones we need to be concerned about").3 
3
 Utah courts take quite a different view when a prosecutor refers to specific facts outside 
the record. See, e.g., State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483,485-86 (Utah 1984) (reversing conviction 
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Furthermore, several non-Utah cases have upheld convictions against attacks 
based on prosecutors' comments similar to those challenged here. For example, in 
Carpenter v. State, 404 So.2d 89 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980), a first-degree murder case, the 
prosecutor stated, "I submit to you that what [Carpenter] is charged with isn't the only 
thing he can be charged with." Id. at 97. The court held that the comment was proper 
since it suggested that Carpenter "could have been charged with a different crime for the 
same offense or incident," not that he had "committed more than one crime." Id. 
In Cruse v. State, 522 So.2d 90, 90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (per curiam), a 
battery case, the prosecutor "told the jury not to show sympathy for appellant because 
he could have been charged with other batteries." The court held that the comment was 
improper, but not "so egregious as to amount to fundamental error." Id. 
In Clarke v. State, 630 A.2d 252 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993), another battery case, 
the prosecutor stated in closing that Clarke "could have been charged with assault with 
intent to kill." Id. at 255. The court saw "nothing whatever in the prosecutor's 
comment that would have inflamed the jury or prejudiced it against [Clarke]," since the 
where prosecutor, in addition to comparing defendant to John Hinckley, referred to defendant's 
former aliases, participation in the federal witness protection program, and "various criminal 
matters"); State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1983) (finding, in dicta, reversible error 
where prosecutor referred to defendants' "double dipping," "forging of signatures," and 
"dishonesty" based on a bankruptcy filing), overruled on other grounds, State v. Roberts, 711 
P.2d 235 (1985); State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 344-45 (Utah App. 1993) (reversing based 
on prosecutor's reference to incident of sexual abuse, to hot tub business, and to "seven charges," 
all unsupported by evidence at trial). 
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comment "was nothing more than the State's admission that it had chosen not to 
prosecute the more serious charge because the evidence was not sufficient." Id. at 256. 
Finally, in Elliott v. State, 450 N.E.2d 1058 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983), an involuntary 
manslaughter case, the court saw no harm in statements that Elliott "could have been 
charged with murder when, in actuality, it was within the prosecutor's discretion to 
decide which statute Elliott would be charged with violating." Id. at 1062. "The 
prosecutor's statement was true," the court wrote, "and we see no error." Id. 
Here, the comments defendant attacks were a tiny portion of closing arguments, 
which filled 68 transcript pages (see R. 222: 27-96). The comments were factually 
ambiguous, if not true, and far from inflammatory. The jury's verdict should not be 
annulled on such slight grounds. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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Instruction No. ft 
A person is guilty of criminal trespass if he: 
(1) enters or remains unlawfully on property, and 
(A) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person, or 
damage to any property; or 
(B) intends to commit any crime; or 
(C) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the 
safety of another; or 
(D) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or 
remains on property as to which notice against entering is 
given by: 
(i) personal communication to the actor by the 
owner or someone with apparent authority to 
act for the owner; 
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously 
designed to exclude intruders; 
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to 
the attention of intruders. 
Instruction No. 
Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecution of any offense based on the conduct. 
A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent 
that he reasonable believes that force is necessary to defend himself or a third person against such 
other's imminent use of unlawful force. However, that person is justified in using force intended 
or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only if he reasonably believes that force is 
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third person as a result of the 
other's imminent use of unlawful force or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. 
A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances described above if he was 
the aggressor or was engaged in combat by agreement, unless he withdraws from the encounter 
and effectively communicates to the other person his intent to do so and, notwithstanding, the 
other person continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful force. 
A person does not have a duty to retreat from the force or threatened force described 
above in a place where that person has lawfully entered or remained. 
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Instruction No. 
In determining the imminence of unlawful force or the reasonableness of a person's decision to 
use force to defend himself, or a third person, you may consider, but are not limited to, any of the 
following factors: 
(1) the nature of the danger; 
(2) the immediacy of the danger 
(3) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or serious bodily injury; 
(4) The other's prior violent acts or violent propensities; and 
(5) Any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship. 
Instruction No. 
You are instructed that if a person is trespassing on someone else's property, he is still 
entitled to use force to defend himself if he reasonably believes force is necessary to prevent death 
or serious bodily injury. 
Instruction No. 
The defendant, Mr. Tuckett, has asserted the affirmative defense of self defense. 
In addition to considering whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each 
element of the charge in this case, you must also consider whether the State has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Tuckett is not entitled to the application of an affirmative defense. 
An affirmative defense means that even if the State has proved the elements of the charged 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, you could still vote to acquit Mr. Tuckett based on the 
possible application of an affirmative defense. On the other hand, if you find that the State has 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of the charged offense and that the State 
has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that no affirmative defense applies to the facts of this case, 
you should vote to convict Mr. Tuckett. Furthermore, you need not reach a consensus on 
whether or not the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the charged 
offense before you consider whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
facts of this case do not support the affirmative defense. Therefore, if upon deliberation of the 
facts of this case, you conclude that the State has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that no 
affirmative defense could apply in this case, you should vote to acquit Mr. Tuckett. 
Mr. Tuckett never has the burden to prove that he is entitled to the application of an 
affirmative defense, but rather, once raised, the State always maintains the burden to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the affirmative defense does not apply to the facts of this case. 
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